Julius Caesar : Insurrection (49 - 48 BCE)

From History of the Hellenistic and Roman World

For if thou must do wrong by breach

Of laws, of right and equity,

Tis best thereby a crown to reach,

In all things else keep piety

Verses of Euripides often cited by Caesar according to Cicero

-Suetonius, Caius Julius Caesar 30

Prelude to Civil War

During his conquest of Gaul, Caesar had seen to it that his part of the Gallic loot was wisely spent in preserving and fortifying his position in Rome. His popularis policies as Praetor and Consul had severely alienated the middle group of senators and he needed to use Pompey's connections with this group to legitimate his actions. However, by 51 it was becoming increasingly clear that the rift between Caesar and Pompey was widening.

In 52 after the victory of Alesia, the whole college of tribunes had put through a law giving Caesar permission to stand for Consul in absentia, a measure that Pompey supported against strong opposition from Cato. However, Pompey's legislation later in the year -- A severe law against bribery at elections made retrospective to 70 BC; a law enforcing a five-year interval between tenure of magistracies in Rome and assumption of provincial commands, and one prohibiting candidature in absentia -- seemed effectively targetted at Caesar. It is interesting to note that Pompey did not consider this legislation applicable to himself, as he immediately had his own command in Spain prolonged by an additional five years.

The crucial issue was whether or not there should be an interval between the date of Caesar's resignation of command in Gaul and the date on which he could enter a proposed second Consulship. If such an interval existed, Caesar would be a private citizen open to prosecution by his enemies; conviction would ruin him politically and might even cost him his life. This had been an issue at Lucca, in 56 at which it would appear that Caesar had been promised such a consulship. In fact, Pompey's law against candidature in absentia was supposed to have excepted Caesar, but Pompey "forgot" to have this clause inscribed unto the tables when the proposal was made law. There can be no doubt that Pompey reneged on his agreements with Caesar; whether this were the acts of a weak and inept politician or calculated treachery to remove Caesar from power, is open to question.

Several efforts were made by Caesar's enemies to have him recalled as early as 51; Caesar survived by having the dangerous proposals vetoed by tribunes of the plebs who were firmly in his camp -- particularly Gaius Scribonius Curio (who had been so outspoken against the triumvirs ten years earlier) in 50 and Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) in 49. Caesar's gallic loot had been put to good use in buying the service of Curio; Mark Antony had been a legate of Caesar in Gaul. Pompey did little to defend Caesar and probably actively encouraged them, and retired to his villa in Tarentum while he spent time with his new wife. That Pompey was now actively qagainst Caesar is shown by a quote from one of Cicero's letters:

"What if he (Caesar) minded," someone else asked., "to be consul and keep his army at the same time?" and he (Pompey) replied with the utmost suavity, "What if my own son should be minded to lay his stick across my back?" By such expressions he has led the people to suspect that there is some trouble between him and Caesar.

-Marcus Tullius Cicero, Letters to his friends

It is highly unlikely that Caesar wanted a civil war (despite the popular image of the scheming and ambitious dictator). In this respect, it is interesting to note the strong warning he makes in Book VII of the Gallic Wars, which would likely have been part of his despatches to the Senate in 51 BCE.

Although the army was distressed by the greatest want of corn, through the poverty of the Boii, the apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the houses, to such a degree, that for several days the soldiers were without corn, and satisfied their extreme hunger with cattle driven from the remote villages; yet no language was heard from them unworthy of the majesty of the Roman people and their former victories. Moreover, when Caesar addressed the legions, one by one, when at work, and said that he would raise the siege, if they felt the scarcity too severely, they unanimously begged him "not to do so; that they had served for several years under his command in such a manner that they never submitted to insult, and never abandoned an enterprise without accomplishing it; that they should consider it a disgrace if they abandoned the siege after commencing it; that it was better to endure every hardship than to not avenge the names of the Roman citizens who perished at Genabum by the perfidy of the Gauls." They intrusted the same declarations to the centurions and military tribunes, that through them they might be communicated to Caesar.

-Gaius Julius Caesar, The Gallic Wars VII.17

The message ought to be clear: Caesar had a loyal and battle-ready army behind him. Throughout 51-50, he attempted to negotiate with his enemies in Rome, and inparticular Pompey, but without much success. The situation was brought to a head by the election of consuls in 50, Gaius Claudius Marcellus and Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, both firm anti-Caesarians. Supported by Pompey, the optimates now went on the offensive. The Optimates succeeded in obtaining a senatorial resolution forcing Caesar to lay down his command at its terminal date. Curio then pushed through a resolution (by 370 votes to 22) that both Caesar and Pompey should lay down their commands simultaneously on December 1, 50. The next day Marcellus (acting without authorization from the Senate or the People) illegally offered the command over all troops in Italy to Pompey, together with the power to raise more, and Pompey accepted. Pompey and the optimates did not wish for peace, as Cicero so cogently put it after meeting with Pompey in later December, 50:

In a word, Pompey appeared not only not to seek peace, but even to fear it.

Caesar attempted a last compromise: On January 1, 49, the Senate received a letter from him proposing that he and Pompeius should lay down their commands simultaneously. Almost bitterly, Caesar recounts in the introduction to his account of the Civil War how his proposal is turned down. Soon after the decision is ratified, Pompey is made Dictator and Caesar would be declared hostis, public enemy if he refused to lay down his command. It happened against the veto of the tribune of the plebs, but the time was no longer ripe for constitutional methods. If Caesar backed down he signed his death warrant, if he did not it remained to be seen who would die: Caesar, Pompeius or the Republic?

On January 10-11, Caesar, accompanied by half a Legion, stood beside the river Rubicon, the border between his province of Cisalpine Gaul and Italia. Quoting the words from the Greek comedy of Menander:

"Let the die be cast!"

He crossed into Italia. The civil war had begun.

Caesar in Italy

Lucan perhaps summarized the position of the two great men best in the short phrase:

Caesar could brook no superior, Pompey no equal.

Caesar the General, EUR (Rome), Museum of Roman Civilization; © B.McManus, http://www.vroma.org, 1982

However, Caesar's real problem was that his success in building up political power made the champions of the old regime so implacably hostile that he was now faced with a choice between putting himself at his enemies' mercy or seizing the monopoly of power at which he was accused of aiming. Even as Caesar marched south towards Rome, continued efforts at negotiation were made. However Pompey's jealousy of Caesar, and the antagonism of the Optimates made it impossible to find a solution to the problem.

Caesar tackled the problems facing him with his usual energy, weakening the position of his enemies in two ways. First and foremost he had to neutralize Pompeius who had supreme command of the senatorial forces and the only one capable of mustering serious resistance against Caesar. The other way his policy of clementia; Caesar had witnessed Sulla's proscriptions and had no intentions of repeating them. Through clemency, he hoped to receive the recognition of the broad senatorial class, as well as paving the way for the co-operation he knew would be necessary after the war. But there is no reason to presume that this clemency was purely political because all sources confirm that this friendly and accommodating manner was a part of his personality. It pained him when Cato, his most bitter enemy, committed suicide to escape his pardon and eighteen months later, after the battle of Pharsalos, he bitterly exclaimed

"Hoc voluerunt" -- "They wanted this."

The senate could muster only four legions in Italia, two of which were former legions of Caesar's to match the six with which Caesar brought into Italia. Pompeius's plan was to abandon Rome and Italy to Caesar and rely on his command of the sea and the resources of the East to starve out the Caesarians. He also had six veteran legions in Spain, that would threaten his rival's rear. But the Optimates, who saw him as the lesser of two evils where neither disciplined or co-operative, and Caesar advanced so swiftly down Italy that he barely succeeded in withdrawing to the Balkans. Cicero briefly summarizes the situation at the end of February, 49:

What a disgrace...Pompey cherished Caresar, suddenly became afraid of him, refused all peace terms, failed to prepare for war, evacuated Rome, culpably lost Picenum, got himself tied up in Apulia, and then went off to Greece without getting in touch with us...

-Marcus Tullius Cicero, Letters to his friends

Caesar in Spain

Realizing the danger posed by Pompeius's Spanish legions, Caesar took the best of his own troops across the Pyrenees, but despite their numerical superiority, the Pompeian commanders refused to risk a pitched battle. He therefore used his cavalry against them to cut their supply lines. In forty days, despite unfavourable terrain and without a battle, he succeeded in subduing an army of greater size, led by experienced generals. Those troops who were willing, he enrolled in his own legions, the rest he disarmed and allowed to go free.

He then had himself appointed Dictator and conducted the Consular elections for 48 BC, which were won by himself and Publius Servilius Isauricus (son of the Isauricus under whom he had earlier served). He took the time to legislate an extension of citizenship to his beloved and loyal friends, the people of Cisalpine Gaul, regulated the finances, put more coins into circulation and assigned provincial governors. Then, resigning his Dictatorship, he marched to Brundisium to prepare for the final confrontation with Pompeius.

Caesar in Greece

Pompey controlled the sea and had amassed in Greece an army of 11 Legions, 7000 cavalry and about 4000 auxiliaries. Unfortunately he was surrounded by friends and Consulars, who all thought they knew precisely what needed to be done. Most of them imagined that Caesar would soon be defeated, but rather than actively help in doing this, they spent their time discussing how to share the spoils. After much dithering, Cicero had finally decided to join Pompey, but what he saw shocked him. Staying only long enough to toss about some sarcastic remarks, he withdrew his support.

Caesar, on the other hand, had none of these problems. With his characteristic swiftness, and despite only having enough transport for seven of his twelve legions, he crossed to Illyria in the very teeth of the enemy fleet. Once again he attempted to negotiate, but it is unlikely that anyone, least of all himself, now believed that a peaceful settlement was possible.

His situation was precarious however, until he received further reinforcements from Italy. With all his troops across, he attempted to encircle Pompeius, just as he had done with the Spanish legions. But an assault by the senatorial forces broke through his lines, and the ensuing battle resulted in Caesar's army suffering heavy losses. But despite his successes, Pompeius entirely failed to keep the initiative and Caesar therefore retreated into Thessaly to regroup.

Pompey pursued, joining forces with the army of his father-in-law, Metellus Scipio. Under pressure from the optimates in his camp and emboldened by superior forces: 45,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry to Caesar's 22,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, he opted to risk a pitched battle on the Plain of Pharsalos, a sensible decision had his opponent not been a commander of genius. Caesar accepted, placing a picked body of legionaries with his cavalry to redress the imbalance caused by Pompey's superiority in cavalry. This unconventional tactic routed the cavalry of the enemy, and allowed his own infantry to outflank Pompey, who fled the field, leaving his army to surrender.

Upon capturing the enemy camp, Caesar burnt Pompey's private papers -- an open gesture of conciliation. Perhaps too, this was the only way in which he could express his regret that most of 15,000 dead were Roman citizens. Having pardoned those of his political opponents that had been captured, he then set out in pursuit of Pompey's.